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Abstract. This work deals with imitation dynamics of the form
x˙i = xi
∑
j xjψ((Ax)i− (Ax)j), where the switching rate is a func-
tion of the payoff differences. Our main tools in the process of
analyzing are Poincare maps and Hamiltonian functions.
After a general introduction to imitation dynamics, we out-
line how to use imitation processes in bimatrix games. A special
emphasis is given to the case of two players with two strategies.
Non-degenerate games and several degenerate cases are analyzed.
There is a topological equivalence between the replicator equation
and all our imitation dynamics for the non-degenerate games but
in the case of degenerate games the imitate the better dynamics is
not topologically equivalent to the replicator equation.
In chapter 4 we analyze RSP games under imitation dynamics.
Zero sum games and the case of cyclic symmetry are covered in full
detail here. Open problems remain of how to extend the analysis
to the general RSP game.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
From the Replicator Equation to Imitation Dynamics
The concept of evolution is older than most of us believe, maybe it
existed ever since human beings were capable of thinking. The Taoists
were well aware of the constant change in the world as well as Heraclit
was with his famous ”Panta Rhei”. They all realized that we are living
in a dynamic world, a world of constant change, but it took a while to
realize how far reaching these primitive assumptions are.
From this merely natural and primitive idea everything came down
to Darwin [3] who was fascinated by the diversity and wealth of species
and set out to put the evolutionary thinking of Lamarck and his pre-
decessors on a solid basis. Darwin was the one who proposed the first
correct mechanism for evolutionary processes but he was not aware of
Mendelian genetics and so his theory was partly rejected because of
the diminishing variability in successive generations.
Nevertheless the theory of Darwin combined with Mendels genetic
theory started to blossom in the unified theory of mathematical biology.
Everyone in the field was concerned with fitness, reproductive success,
mutation and selection, i.e. the evolution of populations under (sexual)
reproduction.
Josef Hofbauer, Karl Sigmund and Peter Taylor [5] introduced and
intensively explored the replicator equation, fundamental to evolution-
ary game theory. In its simplest form, the net growth rate of individuals
using a strategy Ri is given by
x˙i = xi((Ax)i − xAx)
where xi is the relative frequency of individually using strategy Ri,
A = aij is the n× n payoff matrix, (Ax)i is the payoff that a strategy
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Ri player receives and xAx is the average payoff of the population.
The basic interpretation was a biological one, payoff was interpreted
as fitness, respectively reproductive success for each individual and the
offspring of each individual inherits the strategy used by her single
parent.
Thus so far we have considered information transfer in genetic terms
(vertically, i.e. from the parent generation to the offspring) only but
in human societies successful strategies are much more likely adopted
through imitation (horizontally, we copy individuals, with successful
strategies, of the same generation). Recently some researchers pointed
out that our ability to imitate others is unique among animals and has
set up for a new form of evolution. Our societies, the different cultures,
the ability to acquire language are all based on our ability to imitate
any form of behaviour. And human beings are masters in imitating
others [1].
Nowak [7] thinks that language is the fundamental difference that
sets us apart from all other animal species, but maybe there is a deeper
underlying property of which only the human species is capable of
imitation. We are so accustomed to imitation that we seem to have
lost our sense of how complex this phenomenon is and how difficult it
is for any other animal species to imitate at all. Although there are
simple forms of imitation among animals, they are purely task specific,
like a bird imitating a melody.
Maynard Smith and Szathmary [6] consider the evolution of lan-
guage as one of the major transitions of life. One can easily say that
it is the biggest invention of the last six hundred million years, com-
parable in significance only to the origin of life, the first bacteria, the
first cells and the evolution of complex multicellularity. But why is
imitation in any form and specially considering language so important
to us [1]? Genetic information transfer is a rather slow process, while
learning through imitation allows for a much quicker adaptation to new
strategic concepts and gains in fitness. Dawkins proposed a so called
memetic theory, in which ideas are changing and evolving. He calls a
(cultural) information unit a meme.
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So maybe the initial ability to imitate set up for a first step for
the evolution of language. Selection might favor individuals who adapt
quickly to new strategies, thus setting an environment in which good
imitation skills, genetically encoded became better and better. It seems
that language did not evolve as a by-product of a big brain, but that
the cognitive demands for imitating and later on improving language
might have provided a strong selection pressure for increased brain size.
The ability to imitate seems to be the most important aspect of
human evolution and we will study it in some very simplistic models
here.

CHAPTER 2
Imitation Dynamics
We give a very general ansatz as in Hofbauer and Sigmund [5] how
to model imitation processes. Consider a large population of individu-
als, called players, playing a symmetric n×n game with payoff matrix
A, i.e. the players may choose from a set of n different pure strategies
R1 to Rn. The frequency of players using strategy Ri at time t is given
by xi(t). Thus the state of the population, for every moment t is given
by a point on the simplex x(t) ∈ Sn. The payoff (Ax)i of a player
using strategy Ri is given by
∑
aijxj and the average payoff in the
population is xAx.
To model the imitation process we randomly and independently
choose two individuals from time to time. Player 1 has the opportunity
to change his strategy and Player 2 is used as a model which may be
imitated. Player 1 will adopt the strategy of Player 2 with a certain
probability, depending on the payoffs of both players. A general ansatz
is given by an input-output model of the form
(1) x˙i = xi
∑
j
[fji(x)− fij(x)]xj
where fij denotes the switching rate from Player 1 using strategy Ri to
Player 2 using Rj. The product xixj just represents the independent
and random sampling of a Player 1 using strategy Ri and a Player 2
using Rj. The flow in a small time interval ∆t from strategy Ri to
strategy Rj is thus given by xixjfij∆t.
We now take a closer look at the form of the switching rate, assum-
ing that it depends on the current payoffs of both players, we have
(2) fij(x) = f((Ax)i, (Ax)j)
9
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If the switching rate is a function of the payoff difference, i.e. f(u, v) =
ρ(u − v) with monotonically increasing ρ, with ψ(u) = ρ(u) − ρ(−u)
we finally arrive at the dynamics
(3) x˙i = xi
∑
j
xjψ((Ax)i − (Ax)j)
with ψ being an odd and strictly increasing function. A particular
model of interest arises for ρ(u) = uα+ which yields ψ(u) = |u|α sgnu.
Two cases are of special interest. For the limit α → 0 one obtains
a dynamic called ”imitate the better”. Under this dynamics players
only change their strategy to strategies with a current higher payoff,
i.e. f(u, v) = 0 if u < v and f(u, v) = 1 if u > v. This dynamics
is discontinuous on Sn. For α = 1 we have a proportional imitation
rule ψ(u) = u. Players imitate strategies that perform better, with a
probability proportional to the expected gain. This case yields the well
analyzed replicator dynamics.
Other imitation dynamics will not be discussed in this paper.
CHAPTER 3
Bimatrix Games
1. A General Framework for Asymmetric Games under
Imitation Dynamics
Bimatrix games are used to model asymmetric conflicts in evolu-
tionary game theory. We will use these games to describe two popu-
lations interacting with each other. An underlying assumption is that
individuals have only pairwise encounters with individuals from the
opposite population and that there is only a finite number of pure
strategies available.
We have to distinguish players in position 1 and in position 2. We
assume that in position 1 a player has n strategies, while in position 2
a player has m strategies. A and B represent the payoff matrices for 1
and 2. So a 1 player (i.e. a player in position 1) using strategy i against
a 2 player using j receives payoff aij, while the 2 player receives bji.
Mixed strategies for the 1 player are denoted by p ∈ Sn and q ∈ Sm
for the 2 player respectively, where Sn is the n-dimensional simplex.
The corresponding payoffs are pAq and qBp. A Nash equilibrium is a
pair of strategies (p, q) ∈ Sn × Sm where p is a best reply to q and q a
best reply to p.
We consider two different populations. Let x ∈ Sn and y ∈ Sm
denote the frequencies of the strategies for the players in position 1 and
2 respectively. The differential equation of asymmetric games under
imitation dynamics is given by
(4) x˙i =
∑
j
xjρji − xi
∑
j
ρij
(5) y˙i =
∑
j
yj ρ˜ji − yi
∑
j
ρ˜ij
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with ρij = xj[(Ay)j − (Ay)i]α+ and ρ˜ij = yj[(Bx)j − (By)i]α+.
2. The Case of Two Strategies per Player
We now take a look at the case n = m = 2.
We can still use the fact that like in the symmetric case adding a
constant to every column of A and B does not change the dynamics on
Sn × Sm. The dynamics of these games only depends on the relative
payoffs. So we prove the following proposition
Proposition 1. Adding a constant to a column of the payoff matrix
does not change the dynamics of the system.
Proof. It suffices to prove that adding a constant to a column of
A =
[
a b
c d
]
does not change the equations. We add a constant K to
the first column of A and get A˜ =
[
a+K b
c+K d
]
. The payoff for strategy
1 is given by a˜1 = (a+K)y1 +by2 and a˜2 = (c+K)y1 +dy2 for strategy
2. The payoff difference a˜1 − a˜2 = (a + K − (c + K))y1 + (b − d)y2 =
(a− c)y1 + (b− d)y2 is equal to the payoff difference a1 − a2 of A. 
So without loss of generality, we can set the diagonal terms equal
to zero. Then the corresponding payoff matrices are
(6) A =
[
0 a12
a21 0
]
B =
[
0 b12
b21 0
]
Setting x = x1, x2 = 1 − x, y = y1 and y2 = 1 − y we obtain a
two dimensional system of differential equations on the square Q =
[0, 1]× [0, 1] = S2 × S2. To further simplify notation we use the
Definition 1. {u}α := |u|α sgnu
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and get
(7)
x˙ = x(1− x) sgn [a12 − (a12 + a21)y]|a12 − (a12 + a21)y|α
= x(1− x){a12 − (a12 + a21)y}α
y˙ = y(1− y) sgn [b12 − (b12 + b21)x]|b12 − (b12 + b21)x|α
= y(1− y){b12 − (b12 + b21)x}α
We further simplify this system of equations by multiplying with a
so called Dulac function B(x, y). This does not affect the orbits as it
is only a change in velocity. We choose B(x, y) to be
(8) B(x, y) =
1
xy(1− x)(1− y)
The modified system is
(9)
x˙ =
{a12 − (a12 + a21)y}α
y(1− y) = f(y)
y˙ =
{b12 − (b12 + b21)x}α
x(1− x) = g(x)
We will encounter the expressions a12 − (a12 + a21)y ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ y ≤
a12
a12+a21
frequently. To simplify notation we use
Definition 2. a12
a12+a21
= c and b12
b12+b21
= k.
We explicitly mention here that f(c) = g(k) = 0. We state our first
result about this system as a
Proposition 2. For a12a21 ≤ 0 the sign of x˙ does not change in
intQ and so one strategy of player 1 dominates the other one. This is
equally alike for player 2 if b12b21 ≤ 0. The phase portrait is given by
figure 3.3.
Proof. We rewrite a12 − (a12 + a21)y as
(10) a12(1− y)− a21y
. We have (1 − y) ≥ 0, y ≥ 0 and sgn[a12] = sgn[−a21], therefore the
sign of a12 − (a12 + a21)y does not change in intQ. 
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For a12a21 > 0 and b12b21 > 0 we have an interior equilibrium
E = ( b12
b12+b21
, a12
a12+a21
) = (k, c). The dynamic outcome of the system
depends on the signs of a12, a21, b12 and b21. We have to distinguish 4
cases, which we can group into two classes.
Class 1
{
a12, a21 > 0 and b12, b21 > 0
a12, a21 < 0 and b12, b21 < 0
Class 2
{
a12, a21 > 0 and b12, b21 < 0
a12, a21 < 0 and b12, b21 > 0
In Class 1 the signs of aij and bij are identical, whereas in Class 2 the
signs of aij are exactly opposite to the signs of bij. In both of these
classes we have the system being split up into 4 quadrants, separated
by the lines y = c and x = k. In the case of α = 0 the system (9)
is discontinuous at the connection point, for 0 < α < 1 the system is
continuous but not differentiable at the connection point and for α ≥ 1
the system is at least C1. We start with some definitions
Definition 3. We explicitly name the regions ∆i
∆1 = {(x, y) ∈ R2|0 < x < k, 0 < y < c}
∆2 = {(x, y) ∈ R2|k < x < 1, 0 < y < c}
∆3 = {(x, y) ∈ R2|k < x < 1, c < y < 1}
∆4 = {(x, y) ∈ R2|0 < x < k, c < y < 1}
Definition 4. And the corresponding half rays δi separating these
regions
δ1 = {(x, y) ∈ R2|0 < x < k, y = c}
δ2 = {(x, y) ∈ R2|x = k, 0 < y < c}
δ3 = {(x, y) ∈ R2|k < x < 1, y = c}
δ4 = {(x, y) ∈ R2|x = k, c < y < 1}
So the half ray δ1 is above the region ∆1 and the other half rays are
orientated counter clockwise around F.
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Before we state our final theorem of this chapter we abbreviate the
integrals of the vector field defined in
Definition 5. For y ∈ (0, 1) we define
F (y) =
∫ y
c
f(s)ds =
∫ y
c
{a12 − (a12 + a21)s}α
s(1− s) ds(11)
G(x) = −
∫ x
k
g(t)dt = −
∫ x
k
{b12 − (b12 + b21)t}α
t(1− t) dt(12)
Thus F (y) is a continuous function F : (0, 1) → R with F (c) = 0. It
is an injection if restricted to (0, c] or [c, 1). The same properties are
valid for G(x) on the intervals (0, k] and [k, 1), with G(k) = 0. We
explicitly name the functions
F 1 := F |(0,c] F 2 := F |[c,1)(13)
G1 := G|(0,k] G2 := G|[k,1)(14)
Figure 3.1. Sample plots of f(y) : [0, 1] → R and
F (y) : (0, 1)→ (0,∞) or (−∞, 0) for Class 1 and 2
Theorem 1. For Class 1 the interior fixed point E is a saddle as
shown in figure 3.5 and almost all orbits converge to one or the other of
two opposite corners of Q. For Class 2 all orbits in intQ are periodic
orbits surrounding the fixed point F , see figure 3.6. In both cases, the
system is Hamiltonian in intQ, that means it can be written as
(15) x˙ =
∂H
∂y
y˙ = −∂H
∂x
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Figure 3.2. The Hamiltonians of Class 1 and Class 2
Proof. For both systems we have piecewise defined Hamiltonians
in the regions of intQ with Hamiltonian
(16) H(x, y) =
∫
f(y)dy +
∫
g(x)dx = F (y) +G(x)
We have to be careful because the Hamiltonian is not C∞. For α > 0
the Hamiltonian is C1 and for α = 0 it is continuous. We split the
proof into two pieces, starting with
Class 1: W.l.o.g. we choose a12, a21 > 0 and b12, b21 > 0. To prove the
dynamic behaviour of Class 1, we use geometric concepts. In region
∆1 we have a1 − a2 > 0 ⇐⇒ y ≤ c and b1 − b2 > 0 ⇐⇒ x ≤ k, i.e.
the vector field is pointing up and to the right and exactly one orbit
converges to the fixed point F . In region ∆3 the reverse condition
applies which means that the vector field points down and to the left.
Again exactly one orbit in ∆3 converges to the fixed point F . Whereas
in region ∆2 and ∆4 the vector field points away from the fixed point
F , thus we have shown that the fixed point F is a saddle and almost
all orbits converge to either P (0, 1) or P (1, 0).
It is easy to see that only one orbit in ∆1 and ∆3 respectively
converges to the equilibrium F . As the system is Hamiltonian the
value of the invariant of motion in region ∆1 at the fixed point is given
by H∆1(k, c) and there is only one solution curve that reaches the fixed
point keeping this constant value.
For if we assume there are two orbits (x, y1(x)) and (x, y2(x)) with
(17) H∆1(x, y1(x)) = H
∆1(k, c) = H∆1(x, y2(x))
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then
(18) F1(x) +G1(y1(x)) = F1(x) +G1(y2(x))
which is equivalent to G1(y1(x)) = G1(y2(x)) and since G(y) is a con-
tinuous bijection in ∆1 we have
(19) G1(y1(x)) = G1(y2(x)) ⇐⇒ y1(x) = y2(x)
which contradicts our assumption that we have two different orbits and
there is only one orbit in ∆1 converging to the saddle point F .
The same reasoning is valid for a12, a21 < 0 and b12, b21 < 0 the
phase portrait is just the time reversal of the former case, i.e. almost
all orbits converge to either P (0, 0) or P (1, 1).
Class 2: We will again only prove the result w.l.o.g. for a12, a21 > 0
and b12, b21 < 0. Our Hamiltonian is defined piecewise for each of the
4 quadrants and we are looking for a piecewise, on these quadrants
defined solution that gives us a closed orbit. The Hamiltonian for the
regions is denoted by H∆i(x, y). Starting with the Hamiltonian for
region ∆1 we get
H∆1(x, y) = F 1(y) +G2(x) H∆2(x, y) = F 1(y) +G1(x)
H∆3(x, y) = F 2(y) +G1(x) H∆4(x, y) = F 2(y) +G2(x)
Since H˙∆i(x, y) = ∂H
∆i
∂x
x˙ + ∂H
∆i
∂y
y˙ = −y˙x˙ + y˙x˙ ≡ 0, the Hamiltonian
is an invariant of motion. We will now show that all orbits are closed
using a Poincare return map. We start by determining the value of the
constant of motion H∆1(x, y) on a point P1(r, c) on the half ray δ1 for
any given value r = x ∈ [0, k], i.e. we calculate H∆1(r, c).
H∆1δ1 (r, c) = F
1(c) +G1(r)
We follow the solution until it reaches δ2. The value of the invariant of
motion for a point P2(k, s) on δ2 is given by
H∆1δ2 (k, s) = F
1(s) +G1(k) = H∆1δ1 (r, c)
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which is equal to H∆1δ1 (r, c) as the value of the solution is constant along
every orbit. Solving this system for the free parameter F(s) gives
F 1(s) = F 1(c) +G1(r)−G1(k).
The connection point (k, s) is the new starting point to determine the
value of the Hamiltonian in region ∆2 on the half ray δ2. Using the
same point P2(k, s) for H
∆2
δ2
and following the solution until it reaches
a point P3(t, c) on δ3 yields
H∆2δ2 (k, s) = F
1(s) +G2(k) =
= F 1(c) +G1(r)−G1(k) +G2(k)
H∆2δ3 (t, c) = F
1(c) +G2(t)
We solve this equation for the free parameter G2(t) and get
G2(t) = F 1(s) +G2(k)− F 1(c) = G1(r)−G1(k) +G2(k)
Repeating this procedure we get a point P4(k, u) on δ4
H∆3δ3 (t, c) = F
2(c) +G2(t)
H∆3δ4 (k, u) = F
2(u) +G2(k)
Solving the system for F 2(u) yields
F 2(u) = F 2(c) +G2(t)−G2(k) = F 2(c) +G1(r)−G1(k)
In the last step we move on from the point P4(k, u) on the line δ4 to a
point P1(v, c) on our starting line δ1.
H∆4δ4 (k, u) = F
2(u) +G1(k)
H∆4δ1 (v, c) = F
2(c) +G1(v)
Solving for the free parameter G1(v)
G1(v) = F 2(u) +G1(k)− F 2(c) = G1(r)
The value of G1(v) after following the solution around the fixed point
is the same value we calculated for G1(r) at our starting point, which
implies that we arrived at our starting point, i.e. P1(r, c) = P1(v, c).
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This proofs that every orbit for the Class 2 games is closed under this
imitation dynamics. 
On the following four pages are the phase portraits of the dynamics
discussed above. They are grouped into series of 4 portraits, always
in the following order a) Imitate the Better α = 0, b) α = 1/2, c)
Replicator Equation α = 1 and d) α = 2.
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Figure 3.3. Direct: a12 = 1, a21 = −12 , b12 = 1 and
b21 = −13
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Figure 3.4. Indirect: a12 = 1, a21 =
1
2
, b12 = 1 and
b21 = −13
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Figure 3.5. Class 1, F is a saddle point with a12 = 1,
a21 =
1
2
, b12 = −1 and b21 = −12
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Figure 3.6. Class 2, closed orbits around F with a12 =
1, a21 =
1
2
, b12 = 1 and b21 =
1
3
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3. Degenerate 2× 2 Games
There are four cases of degenerate 2 × 2 bimatrix games with one
degenerate strategy (see [2], [8]) and the main task of this part is
to explain the difference in the dynamic outcome of the ”imitate the
better” dynamics, i.e. α = 0 and the dynamics with α > 0 for all
the games. We will ignore games of higher degeneracy because their
dynamic behaviour is less interesting. For Game 1 and 2 we have
b12 = 0 and for Game 3 (Centipede) and Game 4 (Chain-Store) we
have b21 = 0, these cases are represented by the modified equations
(20)
x˙ =
{a12 − (a12 + a21)y}α
y(1− y)
y˙ =
{−b21x}α
x(1− x) or
y˙ =
{b12(1− x)}α
x(1− x)
The first equation is valid for both systems and the second and third
one describe the degeneration, where the second equation belongs to
Game 1 and 2 and the third equation to Game 3 and 4.
We reintroduce the original forms of the equations because some
properties of the system are easier to understand and analyze in these
forms.
(21)
x˙ = x(1− x){a12 − (a12 + a21)y}α = f(x, y)
y˙ = y(1− y){−b21x}α = g1(x, y) or
y˙ = y(1− y){b12(1− x)}α = g2(x, y)
As we will frequently use Jacobians in the analysis of these games,
Ji represents the Jacobian of Game i. The partial derivatives of f(x, y),
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g1(x, y) and g2(x, y) are given by
∂f(x, y)
∂x
= (1− 2x){a12 − (a12 + a21)y}α(22)
∂f(x, y)
∂y
= −(a12 + a21)x(1− x)α|(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)|α−1
∂g1(x, y)
∂x
= −b21y(1− y)α{−b21x}α−1(23)
∂g1(x, y)
∂y
= (1− 2y){−b21x}α(24)
∂g2(x, y)
∂x
= −b12y(1− y)α{b12(1− x)}α−1(25)
∂g2(x, y)
∂y
= (1− 2y){b12(1− x)}α(26)
Game 1. We start with Game 1, which is given by a12 > 0, a21 < 0,
b21 < 0 and b12 = 0. Because of Proposition 2 the sign of x˙ and y˙ does
not change in intQ. For these parameter values we have {a12 − (a12 +
a21)y}α = (a12− (a12 + a21)y)α and we arrive at the Jacobian for (1, 1)
which is
J1(1, 1) =
[
−(−a21)α 0
0 −(−b21)α
]
and we have two negative eigenvalues which implies that (1, 1) is asymp-
totically stable.
Game 2. For Game 2, given by a12 < 0, a21 > 0, b21 < 0 and
b12 = 0 the same reasoning applies and signs do not change in intQ.
So we have {a12 − (a12 + a21)y}α = −(−a12 + (a12 + a21)y)α and the
corresponding Jacobian at a point (0, yˆ) on the y-axis is given by
J2(0, yˆ) =
[
−(−a12 + (a12 + a21)yˆ)α 0
0 0
]
We have one negative eigenvalue and one eigenvalue equal zero at each
equilibrium point (0, yˆ). The Hamiltonian is H(x, y) = F (y) + G(x)
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with bijections F : (0, 1)→ R and G : [0, 1)→ [0,∞):
F (y) =
∫ y
d
f(s)ds = −
∫ y
d
(−a12 + (a12 + a21)s)α
s(1− s) ds
G(x) = −
∫ x
0
g(t)dt = −
∫ x
0
(−b21t)α
t(1− t) dt
with d ∈ (0, 1) arbitrary. G(x) is continuous for x = 0 because integrals
of the form
∫ x
0
tα
t(1−t)dt are convergent for α > 0. Therefore we have
H(0, y) = F (y) +G(0) = F (y) + 0 = constant and we are able to solve
F (y) = C explicitly for every value of C ∈ R. This implies that there
is an orbit converging to every point on the degenerate edge (0, y) and
we have a continuum of stable equilibria there. The functions F (y) and
G(x) for an arbitrary value of α are given by hypergeometric series and
will not be explicitly mentioned here!
Game 3, the Centipede Game. For the Centipede Game we
have a12 < 0, a21 < 0 and b12 > 0. At the line (x, c) parallel to the
x-axis x˙ changes sign for the Centipede and Chain-Store Game. For
x = 1 and yˆ > c, we have {a12 − (a12 + a21)y}α = (a12 − (a12 + a21)y)α
again and therefore the Jacobian at (1, yˆ) is
J3(1, yˆ) =
[
−(a12 − (a12 + a21)yˆ)α 0
0 0
]
We have one negative eigenvalue and one eigenvalue 0. At (1, c) the
Hamiltonian has a global minimum on (0, 1]× (0, 1), this implies that
no orbit reaches or leaves (1, c) and it is a stable equilibrium too. For
yˆ < c the sign of the matrix element j11 of J3(1, yˆ) changes and we
have one positive eigenvalue and one eigenvalue equal 0.
Proceeding in the same way as in Game 2 one can show that there
is an orbit leading to every point (1, yˆ) with yˆ > c and one has a
continuum of stable equilibria.
Game 4, the Chain-Store Game. For the Chain-Store Game
we have a12 < 0, a21 < 0 and b12 < 0. The Jacobian for (1, yˆ > c) is
equal to the Jacobian J3(1, yˆ) of the Centipede game. So we have one
negative eigenvalue and one equal 0 and a continuum of stable equilibria
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like in the Centipede Game, whereas the point (1, c) is not stable for
the Chain-Store Game, because there is one orbit leading to and one
orbit going away from (1, c). They both have H(x, y) = H(1, c).
For (0, 0), with {b12}α = −(−b12)α we arrive at
J4(0, 0) =
[
(−a12)α 0
0 −(−b12)α
]
with two negative eigenvalues and hence asymptotic stability for (0, 0).
Figure 3.7. The Hamiltonians of the Centipede and
Chain-Store Game
The difference in the phase portraits for α = 0 and α > 0 is due to
the loss of degeneration in the limiting case α = 0. The degenerated
line becomes the two strategy single population replicator dynamics
with no internal equilibrium.
The Limiting Case α = 0 in Degenerate Bimatrix Games.
The equations for α = 0 become
(27)
x˙ = x(1− x) sgn[a12 − (a12 + a21)y]
y˙ = y(1− y) sgn[−b21x] or
y˙ = y(1− y) sgn[b12(1− x)]
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In intQ this is just the zero sum replicator dynamics. We will use
the following matrices to describe the games
A1 =
[
0 1
−1 0
]
B1 =
[
0 1
−1 0
]
A2 =
[
0 −1
1 0
]
B2 =
[
0 −1
1 0
]
For Game 1 this is just the zero sum game replicator dynamics with
payoff matrices A1 and B1, thus the system for x > 0 is
x˙ = x(1− x)
y˙ = y(1− y)
but on the degenerate edge x = 0 we have sgn[−b21x] = sgn[0] = 0 and
y˙ = y(1− y) sgn[0] = 0.
For Game 2 we have x˙ = −x(1 − x) and we arrive at the replicator
equation with payoff matrices A2 and B1. For the behaviour on the
degenerate edge see Game 1.
For the Centipede and Chain-Store Game we still have the line (x, c)
where x˙ changes sign, i.e. for y > c we have x˙ = x(1−x) and therefore
A1 and for y < c we have x˙ = −x(1− x) with A2
The games only differ in the sign of y˙. For the Centipede Game
we have y˙ = y(1 − y) and for the Chain-Store Game we arrive at
y˙ = −y(1−y). In the Centipede Game the dynamics for y is equivalent
to the replicator dynamics with B1 and the Chain-Store corresponds to
B2. For both games the degenerate edge x = 1 has y˙ = 0 and we have
a continuum of stable equilibria there. The signum function produces a
discontinuity in the vector field at the degenerate edge. The behaviour
is similar to that of the BNN or best response dynamics [8].
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Figure 3.8. Game 1: a12 = 1, a21 = −1, b12 = 0 and
b21 = −1
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Figure 3.9. Game 2: a12 = −1, a21 = 1, b12 = 0 and
b21 = −1
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Figure 3.10. Centipede: a12 = −1, a21 = −1, b12 = 1
and b21 = 0
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Figure 3.11. Chain-Store: a12 = −1, a21 = −1, b12 =
−1 and b21 = 0
CHAPTER 4
The Rock-Scissors-Paper Game
Generally a rock-scissors-paper game, short RSP game is character-
ized by having three different pure strategies. Each strategy is superior
to one strategy and inferior to the remaining other one, i.e. strategy R1
is beaten by R2, which is beaten by R3, which is finally beaten by R1
again. In its normalized form this game is given by the payoff matrix
(28) A =
 0 −a2 b3b1 0 −a3
−a1 b2 0

with ai, bi > 0. This game always admits an interior equilibrium p
which is given by
p =
(b2b3 + b2a3 + a3a2, b3b1 + b3a1 + a1a3, b1b2 + b1a2 + a1a2)
Σ
with Σ > 0 such that p ∈ S3. The only rest points on the boundary are
the vertices. The behaviour of RSP under the replicator dynamics is
well analyzed in Hofbauer and Sigmund [5]. The replicator dynamics is
just a special case of the imitation dynamics we consider, as mentioned
earlier in the text. We will show that some properties valid for the
replicator dynamics are also valid for the imitation dynamics under
consideration.
1. Zero Sum Games
In this section we will restrict our attention to zero sum games,
where the gain of one player is the loss of the other player, i.e. bi = ai+1.
We will show that these games admit closed orbits under imitation
dynamics. The payoff matrix of a 3× 3 zero sum game is
33
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(29) A =
 0 −a ba 0 −c
−b c 0

where A is skew-symmetric and a, b, c > 0. Our system of differential
equations looks like
(30) x˙i =
3∑
j=1
xjρji − xi
3∑
j=1
ρij
with ρij = xj[(Ay)j − (Ay)i]α+ = xj(aj − ai)α+. Explicitly written out
this is
(31)
x˙1 = x1(x2{a1 − a2}α + x3{a1 − a3}α)
x˙2 = x2(x1{a2 − a1}α + x3{a2 − a3}α)
x˙3 = x3(x1{a3 − a1}α + x2{a3 − a2}α)
The payoffs are given by
a1 = −ax2 + bx3 a2 = ax1 − cx3 a3 = −bx1 + cx2
differences are given by
a1 − a2 = x3(b+ c)− a(x1 + x2) =
= x3(a+ b+ c)− a
a2 − a1 = a− x3(a+ b+ c)
a1 − a3 = b(x1 + x3)− x2(a+ c) =
= b− x2(a+ b+ c)
a3 − a1 = x2(a+ b+ c)− b
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a2 − a3 = x1(a+ b)− c(x2 + x3) =
= x1(a+ b+ c)− c
a3 − a2 = c− x1(a+ b+ c)
After a change in velocity, with the Dulac function
B(x1, x2, x3) =
1
x1x2x3(a+ b+ c)
and setting A = a
a+b+c
, B = b
a+b+c
and C = c
a+b+c
we finally arrive at
(32)
x˙1 =
{x3 − A}α
x3
− {x2 −B}
α
x2
=
= h(x3)− g(x2)
x˙2 =
{x1 − C}α
x1
− {x3 − A}
α
x3
=
= f(x1)− h(x3)
x˙3 =
{x2 −B}α
x2
− {x1 − C}
α
x1
=
= g(x2)− f(x1)
We have three sign-functions invoked in this expression, which split up
the simplex in six distinct regions. The change of direction in the vector
field depends on the value of α. The change for α = 0 is discontinuous,
getting to a continuous but not differentiable change for 0 < α < 1 and
arriving at a continuously differentiable C1 vector field for α ≥ 1. As
in chapter 3 we state
Definition 6. For x1, x2, x3 ∈ (0, 1] and A+B + C = 1 we have
F (x1) =
∫ x1
C
f(s)ds =
∫ x1
C
{s− C}α
s
ds(33)
G(x2) =
∫ x2
B
g(t)dt =
∫ x2
B
{t−B}α
t
dt(34)
H(x3) =
∫ x3
A
h(u)du =
∫ x3
A
{u− A}α
u
du(35)
We have the continuous functions F,G,H : (0, 1] → R with F (C) =
G(B) = H(A) = 0, which is a global minimum for all three functions.
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We also define restrictions of the functions to the domains
Fˆ := F |(0,C] F˜ := F |[C,1]
Gˆ := G|(0,B] G˜ := G|[B,1]
Hˆ := H|(0,A] H˜ := H|[A,1]
where they are monotonic.
Figure 4.1. Sample plot of the function f and its Inte-
gral F , with C = 1/3
The change x˙i is independent of xi and the system is Hamiltonian
in some sense, see [4].
V (x1, x2, x3) = F (x1) +G(x2) +H(x3)
defined on the interior of the simplex, respectively in each region (de-
pending on α) serves as a sort of Hamiltonian.
V˙ (x1, x2, x3) =
∂V
∂x1
∂x1
∂t
+
∂V
∂x2
∂x2
∂t
+
∂V
∂x3
∂x3
∂t
= f(x1)x˙1 + g(x2)x˙2 + h(x3)x˙3 =
= f(x1)(h(x3)− g(x2))+
+ g(x2)(f(x1)− h(x3))+
+ h(x3)(g(x2)− f(x1)) ≡ 0
As F (C) = 0, G(B) = 0 and H(A) = 0 have a global minimum in these
points, the function V (x1, x2, x3) has a global minimum for V (C,B,A).
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Definition 7. The lines
l1 = {x ∈ S3 : a2(x) = a3(x)} = {x ∈ S3 : x1 = C}
l2 = {x ∈ S3 : a1(x) = a3(x)} = {x ∈ S3 : x2 = B}
l3 = {x ∈ S3 : a1(x) = a2(x)} = {x ∈ S3 : x3 = A}
divide S3 into six regions.
Definition 8. The regions are given by all permutations of the
ordering of the payoffs
A1 = {x ∈ S3 : a1 > a2 > a3}
A2 = {x ∈ S3 : a2 > a1 > a3}
A3 = {x ∈ S3 : a2 > a3 > a1}
A4 = {x ∈ S3 : a3 > a2 > a1}
A5 = {x ∈ S3 : a3 > a1 > a2}
A6 = {x ∈ S3 : a1 > a3 > a2}
Definition 9. The Hamiltonians in these regions are given by
V A1(x1, x2, x3) = Fˆ (x1) + G˜(x2) + Hˆ(x3)
V A2(x1, x2, x3) = Fˆ (x1) + G˜(x2) + H˜(x3)
V A3(x1, x2, x3) = Fˆ (x1) + Gˆ(x2) + H˜(x3)
V A4(x1, x2, x3) = F˜ (x1) + Gˆ(x2) + H˜(x3)
V A5(x1, x2, x3) = F˜ (x1) + Gˆ(x2) + Hˆ(x3)
V A6(x1, x2, x3) = F˜ (x1) + G˜(x2) + Hˆ(x3)
Theorem 2. All orbits of the zero sum RSP game are closed orbits
under the imitation dynamics.
Proof. We proceed as in chapter 2 using a Poincare return map,
i.e. we follow a solution around the interior fixed point F to show that
the orbit of every solution is closed. We start at the line l1 : x1 = C,
which is a one dimensional manifold so we only need to specify one
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parameter r to define a point on it, i.e. P1 = (C, 1−A−C−r, A+r) =
(C,B − r, A+ r). Starting at P1 the solution has constant value in A1
on the curve satisfying
V A1(x1, x2, x3) = V
A1
l1
(P1) = Fˆ (C) + G˜(B − r) + Hˆ(A+ r)
It reaches a point P3 = (C + s, 1− A− C − s, A) = (C + s, B − s, A)
on the line l3 : x3 = A depending on the new parameter s only. The
value of the invariant of motion their is
V A1l3 (P3) = Fˆ (C + s) + G˜(B − s) + Hˆ(A)
which still equals V A1l1 (C,B− r, A+ r). We abbreviate Vli(x1, x2, x3) =
V (Pi) and solve the system
V A1l1 (P1) = Fˆ (C) + G˜(B − r) + Hˆ(A+ r)
= Fˆ (C + s) + G˜(B − s) + Hˆ(A) = V A1l3 (P3)
with respect to the new parameter s which yields
Fˆ (C + s) + G˜(B − s) = Fˆ (C) + G˜(B − r) + Hˆ(A+ r)− Hˆ(A)
Our next starting point for the solution curve in A2 is therefor given
by P3(C + s, B − s, A) and the value of the constant of motion is
V A2l3 (P3) = Fˆ (C + s) + G˜(B − s) + H˜(A)
The solution reaches a point P2 = (C + t, B,A− t) on l2 that satisfies
V A2l2 (P2) = Fˆ (C + s) + G˜(B − s) + H˜(A)
= Fˆ (C + t) + G˜(B) + H˜(A− t) = V A2l3 (P3)
Solving this system for the new parameter t yields
Fˆ (C+t)+H˜(A−t) = Fˆ (C)−G˜(B)+H˜(A)−Hˆ(A)+G˜(B−r)+Hˆ(A+r)
Starting on the line l2 at the point P2 the constant of motion in region
A3 is given by
V A3l2 (P2) = Fˆ (C + t) + Gˆ(B) + H˜(A− t)
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Reaching a point P1∗ = (C,B + u,A− u) on l1, yields the system
V A3l2 (P2) = Fˆ (C + t) + Gˆ(B) + H˜(A− t)
= Fˆ (C) + Gˆ(B + u) + H˜(A− u) = V A3l1 (P1∗)
Solving this system for the new parameter u yields
Gˆ(B+u)+H˜(A−u) = Gˆ(B)−G˜(B)+H˜(A)−Hˆ(A)+G˜(B−r)+H˜(A+r)
Going from A3 to A4, we start at P1∗, finish at P3∗ = (C − v,B+ v,A)
and get the system
V A4l1 (P1∗) = F˜ (C) + Gˆ(B + u) + H˜(A− u) =
= F˜ (C − v) + Gˆ(B + v) + H˜(A) = V A4l3 (P2∗)
Solving this system for the new parameter v yields
F˜ (C−v)+Gˆ(B+v) = Fˆ (C)+Gˆ(B)−G˜(B)−Hˆ(A)+G˜(B−r)+H˜(A+r)
In A5, we start at P3∗ on l3, finish at P2∗ = (C − w,B,A + w) on l2
and get the system
V A5l3 (P3∗) = F˜ (C − v) + Gˆ(B + v) + Hˆ(A)
= F˜ (C − w) + Gˆ(B) + Hˆ(A+ w) = V A5l2 (P2∗)
Solving this system for the new parameter w yields
F˜ (C − w) + Hˆ(A+ w) = Fˆ (C)− G˜(B) + G˜(B − r) + H˜(A+ r)
in the last region A6 we start the line l2 at the point P2∗ and finally
arrive at our starting line l1 at a P¯1 = (C,B − r¯, A+ r¯)
V A6l2 (P2∗) = F˜ (C − w) + G˜(B) + Hˆ(A+ w)
= F˜ (C) + G˜(B − r¯) + Hˆ(A+ r¯) = V A6l1 (P¯1)
Solving this system for the new parameter r¯ yields
G˜(B − r¯) + Hˆ(A+ r¯) = Fˆ (C)− F˜ (C) + G˜(B − r) + Hˆ(A+ r) =
= G˜(B − r) + Hˆ(A+ r)
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Figure 4.2. The Zero Sum Game with A = 1
2
, B = 1
6
and C = 1
3
The only possible and valid solution of this system is r¯ = r, since G˜
is a continuous bijection. So after following the solution around the
interior fixed point we arrive at the point P¯ (C,B − r¯, A+ r¯) plugging
in r¯ = r the Hamiltonians are equal and we arrive at the starting point
P (C,B − r, A+ r). 
2. Imitate the Better, the Special Case α = 0
We will now take a closer look at the special case α = 0, but for
general RSP games with payoff matrix (28) for we need some result
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about it later on in the text. In this case the system (31) looks like
(36)
x˙1 = x1[x2 sgn [a1 − a2]− x3 sgn [a1 − a3]]
x˙2 = x2[−x1 sgn [a1 − a2] + x3 sgn [a2 − a3]]
x˙3 = x3[x1 sgn [a1 − a3]− x2 sgn [a2 − a3]]
The vector fields in the regions Ai are given explicitly by
Region A1 with a1 > a2 > a3
x˙1 = x1(x2 + x3)
x˙2 = x2(−x1 + x3)(37)
x˙3 = x3(−x1 − x2)
Taking a look at the equation one immediately recognizes that this
is just the replicator dynamics with payoff matrix
(38) A =
 0 1 1−1 0 1
−1 −1 0

So the connection is that smooth pieces of the orbits of the imitate
the better dynamics are part of orbits of the replicator dynamics, but
for a different game. There is no interior rest point for these games
under the replicator equation. Nevertheless one gets the usual invari-
ant of motion V (x1, x2, x3) =
∏
xpii where p = (p1, p2, p3) is a fixed
point of the replicator equation with p /∈ S3. So for region A1 we
have p = (1,−1, 1) and a constant of motion in region A1 is given by
V A1(x1, x2, x3) =
x1x3
x2
Region A2 with a2 > a1 > a3
x˙1 = x1(−x2 + x3)
x˙2 = x2(x1 + x3) V
A2(x1, x2, x3) =
x2x3
x1
(39)
x˙3 = x3(−x1 − x2)
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Region A3 with a2 > a3 > a1
x˙1 = x1(−x2 − x3)
x˙2 = x2(x1 + x3) V
A3(x1, x2, x3) =
x1x2
x3
(40)
x˙3 = x3(x1 − x2)
Region A4 with a3 > a2 > a1
x˙1 = x1(−x2 − x3)
x˙2 = x2(x1 − x3) V A4(x1, x2, x3) = x1x3
x2
(41)
x˙3 = x3(x1 + x2)
Region A5 with a3 > a1 > a2
x˙1 = x1(x2 − x3)
x˙2 = x2(−x1 − x3) V A5(x1, x2, x3) = x2x3
x1
(42)
x˙3 = x3(x1 + x2)
Region A6 with a1 > a3 > a2
x˙1 = x1(x2 + x3)
x˙2 = x2(−x1 − x3) V A6(x1, x2, x3) = x1x2
x3
(43)
x˙3 = x3(−x1 + x2)
3. Cyclic Symmetry ai = a and bi = b ∀i and α = 0
In this special case the payoff matrix has the form
(44) A =
 0 −a bb 0 −a
−a b 0

with a, b > 0. Actually the flow of the system only depends on the
ratio of a and b. So we set a = bm and arrive at
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(45) A =
 0 −bm bb 0 −bm
−bm b 0
 = b
 0 −m 11 0 −m
−m 1 0

Theorem 3. The interior rest point F = (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) of (31) with
payoff matrix (45) and α = 0 is a sink for b > a (i.e. 1 > m) and a
source for b < a (i.e. 1 < m), for a = b this is just the zero sum game
(36) with ai = bi = 1.
Before we start with the proof, we need a redefinition of the lines
li.
Definition 10. The lines
l1 = {x ∈ S3 : a2(x) = a3(x)} = {x ∈ S3 : x1 = x2 +mx3
1 +m
}
l2 = {x ∈ S3 : a1(x) = a3(x)} = {x ∈ S3 : x2 = x3 +mx1
1 +m
}
l3 = {x ∈ S3 : a1(x) = a2(x)} = {x ∈ S3 : x3 = x1 +mx2
1 +m
}
divide S3 into six regions.
Definition 11. Points Pi on the lines li are ordered counter-clockwise
around the equilibrium and are thus given by a parametrization of the
lines
P1 = (
1
3
− 1−m
1 + 2m
r,
1
3
− r, 1
3
+
2 +m
1 + 2m
r}
P2 = (
1
3
+
2 +m
1 + 2m
s,
1
3
− 1−m
1 + 2m
,
1
3
− s}
P3 = (
1
3
+
1 + 2m
2 +m
t,
1
3
− t, 1
3
+
1−m
2 +m
t}
with a = bm and r, s, t ∈ [0, 1/3]
Proof. The vector field of this game for α = 0 is just the vector
field of (36) under the imitate the better dynamics. We have the same
constants of motion. We will prove this theorem by showing that every
solution, starting on a point Pi on li is getting closer to or farer away
from the equilibrium, depending on the values of a and b,respectively
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on the value of m. The system is cyclically symmetric on the simplex,
which implies that it suffices to analyze the flow from a point P1 on l1,
to P3 and finally arriving at a point P2 on l2. As earlier mentioned the
Figure 4.3. The simplex with a solution curve starting
at the line l1, going to l2 and finally arriving at l3
constants of motion are the same as for (36), we list only the two used
in this proof i.e.
V A1(x1, x2, x3) =
x1x3
x2
V A2(x1, x2, x3) =
x2x3
x1
So the value of the constant of motion V A1 for a given point P1(r) on
l1 in region A1 is given by
(46) V A1(P1(r)) = V
A1(r) =
(1
3
− 1−m
1+2m
r)(1
3
+ 2+m
1+2m
r)
1
3
− r
Following this procedure we calculate V A1 for a point P3(t) on l3.
(47) V A1(P3(t)) = V
A1(t) =
(1
3
+ 1+2m
2+m
t)(1
3
+ 1−m
2+m
t)
1
3
− t
When the solution reaches A2 the value of the constant of motion
changes according to the change of the region. So we take V A2 in-
stead of V A1 and start the procedure again. We calculate V A2 for a
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point P3(t) on l3, which yields
(48) V A2(P3(t)) = V
A2(t) =
(1
3
− t)(1
3
+ 1−m
2+m
t)
1
3
+ 1+2m
2+m
t
and finally the solution arrives at the line l2 at a point P2(s), where
the constant of motion has the value
(49) V A2(P2(s)) = V
A2(s) =
(1
3
− 1−m
1+2m
s)(1
3
− s)
1
3
+ 2+m
1+2m
s
The next step is to find out at which point P3 on l3 a solution arrives
when started from a point P1 on l1. Solving the quadratic system
V A1(r) = V A1(t)(50)
(1
3
− 1−m
1+2m
r)(1
3
+ 2+m
1+2m
r)
1
3
− r =
(1
3
+ 1+2m
2+m
t)(1
3
+ 1−m
2+m
t)
1
3
− t(51)
for the variable t gives us the two solutions
t1,2(r,m) =
1
6(−1 + 3r)(−1 +m)(1 + 2m)3 [−8− 9r
2(−1 +m)(2 +m)3 − 2m(5 + 2m)(4 +m(5 + 2m))±
±
√
(2 +m)2(81r4(−1 +m)2(2 +m)4 + 4(2 +m)2(1 + 2m)4 − 24r(−1 +m)(1 + 2m)5+
+108(−1 +m)2(2 +m)(r + 2rm)3 + 108(−1 +m)(4 + 5m)(r + 2rm)2(1 +m+m2)]
we can discard t2(r,m) because t2(r,m) ≤ 0 for all r,m ≥ 0. We set
t1(r,m) = t(r,m)
We use the same procedure to calculate a function s(t,m). Solving
the system for the region A2
V A2(t) = V A2(s)(52)
(1
3
− t)(1
3
+ 1−m
2+m
t)
1
3
+ 1+2m
2+m
t
=
(1
3
− 1−m
1+2m
s)(1
3
− s)
1
3
+ 2+m
1+2m
s
(53)
yields the two solutions
s1,2(t,m) =
1
(6(−1 +m)(2 +m+ t(3 + 6m))) [−2(2 +m)
2 − 9t2(−2 +m+m2)±
±
√
(2 +m)2(9t2(−1 +m) + 2(2 +m))2 − 12t(−2 + 3t(−1 +m)− 4m)
(−1 +m)(1 + 2m)(2 +m+ t(3 + 6m))]
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Figure 4.4. The function s(r,m), with m = 1/2, 1, 2.
For 0 < m < 1 we have s(r,m) < r and for 1 < m we
have s(r,m) > r. For m = 1 we have s(r, 1) = r
Once again we can discard the second solution as s2(t,m) ≥ 13 for all
t,m ≥ 0. Setting s1(t,m) = s(t,m)
So far we have seen where a solution starting at l1 ends up at l3 and
what happens if we go from l3 to l2. Combining these two functions we
get a map s(t(r),m) = s(r,m) assigning to each value r, which repre-
sents a point on l1 a value s on l2. The function s : [0, 1/3]× (0,∞)→
[0, 1/3] is a rather clumsy object, but with the help of a computer al-
gebra system (we used mathematica with Reduce[s[r,m] < r&&r >
0&&y > 0,r,m,Reals]), one easily verifies that for 0 < m < 1 the
function s(r,m) < r and the interior fixed point is globally attractive.
For m = 1 we arrive at (36) with ai = bi = 1 and conclude that all
orbits are closed. To see this one only has to solve (51)and (53), which
yields r = t = s.
For 1 < m the function s(r,m) > r and therefore the interior fixed
point is a source and every orbit converges to the boundary, which is
a heteroclinic cycle. 
3. CYCLIC SYMMETRY ai = a and bi = b ∀i AND α = 0 47
Figure 4.5. Cyclic Symmetry for m = 2

Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit bescha¨ftigt sich mit Imitationsdynamiken der Form
x˙i = xi
∑
j xjψ((Ax)i− (Ax)j), in denen die Wechselrate eine Funktion
der Auszahlungsdifferenz ist. Fu¨r die Analyse der Dynamiken werden
Poincare-Abbildungen und Hamiltonfunktionen verwendet.
Nach einer Einfu¨hrung u¨ber Imitationsdynamiken beschreiben wir
Bimatrixspiele unter diesen Dynamiken. Besonderes Augenmerk wird
auf den Fall mit zwei Spielern und zwei Strategien gelegt. Es werden
sowohl nicht-degenerierte, als auch einige degenerierte Fa¨lle analysiert.
Fu¨r nicht-degenerierte Spiele ist die Replikatorgleichung topologisch
equivalent zu den betrachteten Imitationsdynamiken. Im Falle der de-
generierten Spiele ist die ”imitate the better” Dynamik α = 0 nicht
mehr topologisch equivalent zur Replikatorgleichung und den Fa¨llen
α > 0.
Das Kapitel 4 bescha¨ftigt sich mit Schere-Stein-Papier Spielen unter
den Imitationsdynamiken. Null-Summen-Spiele und der Fall zyklischer
Symmetrie werden vollsta¨ndig behandelt. Das dynamische Verhalten
des allgemeinen Schere-Stein-Papier Spiels konnte nicht gekla¨rt wer-
den.
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